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Abstract
Whether pension reforms lead to an improvement in macroeconomic performance
is a controversial question. Some countries, which have implemented reforms, claim
better economic performance while in others a positive result has yet to be seen. This
paper explores two aspects of this issue further: Firstly, we provide a comprehensive in-
vestigation of the impact of pension reforms on output, capital stock and consumption.
Secondly, we attempt to uncover the factors which lead to cross country heterogeneity
in the impact of reform. Our results suggest that pension reform led to an improve-
ment in macroeconomic performance. However, there is also evidence to suggest that
this improvement was more pronounced in countries with lower public debt, lower age
dependency ratio, more developed financial markets and a higher rate of privatisations.
JEL codes: E6; H55; C23
Keywords: Pension Reform, Dynamic Panels.
Preliminary Version
1 Introduction
"International experience with reforms over the past ten years show that there’s
no single recipe for reform-that countries can mix and match diﬀerent elements
of an eﬀective pension system, based on their own needs. What also emerges is
the continued need to reduce poverty, eliminate the risk of rapidly falling living
standards, and protecting vulnerable elderly people from economic and social
crises."
Robert Holzmann, Director of the World Bank’s Social Protection Unit.
Pension reforms in many countries have been a necessity as the problems which have
initiated them are real and require immediate action: Population ageing and large budget
∗Department of Economics,Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street,
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deficits have undermined economic performance and distorted resource allocation. Old
public pension systems, too weak to bridge the gap between their obligations and revenues,
have drained public budgets and crowded out important funds meant to go to education,
health or infrastructure. It has also been argued that the structure of pension systems can
distort labour markets, delay further development of financial markets and hinder economic
growth. For these reasons many developed and emerging economies have been forced to
implement reforms ranging form mild to radical in order to address these issues, despite
the political cost.
However, almost two decades after a few Latin American countries started reforming
their public pension systems, with Chile as a pioneer, the true results of these reforms
are under controversy. A natural question would be whether the reform countries have
benefited from those reforms and whether they experienced the anticipated improvements.
Economic theory suggests that countries which adopt pension reforms experience three
main eﬀects at the economic level: First, a direct link between contributions and benefits
is established, reducing the labor market distortions with which traditional and unfunded
programs are considered to be fraught (World Bank, 1994). Second, the evolution of private
pension funds contributes to further development of financial markets inducing a more
eﬃcient allocation of resources. Regarding the public sector, whole or partial privatization
of unsustainable pension funds eliminates budget deficits and improves the creditworthiness
of the government.
A number of computational OLG models have been employed to investigate the eﬀects
of a shift to a fully funded scheme. Not surprisingly all these models depend highly on
initial assumptions such as the method of financing the transition period, credit constraints
or perfect capital markets. Those ones that assume tax financed transition from a pay as
you go (PAYGO) to a fully funded (FF) pension system, demonstrate output and welfare
gains in the new steady state (e.g. Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1993; Valdés-Prieto and
Cifuentes, 1997; Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1997). In most theoretical OLG models
ageing of population is a crucial assumption which triggers capital flows in open economies.
The interested reader may want to refer to Kotlikoﬀ et al. (1997) where privatisation of
the public pension system takes place in constant population growth, excluding this way
any eﬀects coming from population ageing.
Despite the above economic benefits there are some serious drawbacks that prevent
many governments from implementing those reforms. The main one is that the positive
impact can be seen in the medium run while the current working generation bears the
cost of the reform. Apart from the political cost that a government may face, there is a
school of though that believes that social security should remain under the control of the
public sector. Insuﬃcient savings or "inadequate preparation", as Diamond (2004) prefers
to name it, is the main argument in favor of public pensions systems. A person may end
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up with lower consumption after retirement not because one did not save enough while
working but one did not choose a sensible portfolio for long term investment. This can
happen for a number of reasons: insuﬃcient information to choose a profitable investment
plan, diﬃculty to obtain insurance against earnings risk for after retirement income, or to
plan income flows after retirement are just a few. At the macroeconomic level, financial
markets often suﬀer from great volatility and in some developing countries capital markets
may luck of regulatory capacity and bear high investment risk for the individual investor
of a limited information set (Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999).
The above factors hold assuming that the individual is a rational optimizing agent.
There are also factors that prevent an agent from a rational decision making. These are
uncertainty about the life length with longevity to be one of the main issues in actuarial
science, reluctancy to take into account future illness or disability and the myopic belief in
a paternalistic government i.e. the government will care for its citizens. To a great extent
this paternalistic element in the function of the government has been largely used to justify
mandatory savings.
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the impact of pension reform using a
large cross country panel data set. We investigate if pension reforms increase output and
consider the factors that may aﬀect the magnitude of this relationship between pension
reforms and macroeconomic performance. This paper extents the current existing literature
in a number of ways: Firstly, unlike the previous literature we provide a comprehensive
investigation on the impact of pension reforms not only on output and its growth but
also on capital formation, investment and consumption. Predictions on the impact on
these additional variables are usually available on theoretical computational models such
as Börsch-Supan et al. (2005) and Equipe INGENUE (2001). Empirical estimates on the
other hand are less readily available even though they maybe of relevance to policy makers.
In addition the existing literature does not provide any guidance on the reasons why some
countries experience larger benefits from reforms than others. The second part of the paper
considers whether factors such as the age dependency ratio, the level of public debt, the
degree of financial deepening, and the number of privatisation may explain cross country
heterogeneity in the impact of pension reforms. Our main results suggest the following:
Firstly, there is strong evidence that pension reforms increases output, consumption and
capital formation in the countries in our panel. Our estimates suggest that the benefits
arise gradually. Secondly, we find that these benefits are larger for countries with lower
public debt, lower age dependency ratio, higher degree of financial deepening and when
pension reforms had been a part of a wider privatisation plan.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section two describes the main available
schemes and proposals for modifications in social security, briefly reviews the recent re-
forms occurred in diﬀerent geographical areas and oﬀers an evaluation of those reforms in
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accordance with relevant empirical and theoretical literature. Section three provides the
hypotheses to be tested, sets the model and describes the methodology. In this section we
also describe the methodology we use to test for main contributors on the precedent re-
forms. The next section describes the data and the sources used in estimations. In section
five we discuss our results for the above hypotheses. Section six concludes.
2 Pension Reforms around the World and Evaluation
In the last two decades many countries have reformed their social security system by
following either parametric (non structural) or structural reforms or a combination of the
two. The first type involves improvements of the existing public system to strengthen its
financial sustainability in the long run. Measures may involve raising the retirement age,
reduction of benefits etc. Structural reforms are more radical and entail replacement of the
whole or parts of the public system. A private component is introduced which operates
in parallel with the public one and may compete with it. The main characteristics of
the private systems are defined contributions while benefits remain uncertain depending
on the amount, density and accumulation of contributions, investment returns and other
macroeconomic factors.
One of the most influential plans concerning improvements of the existing pension
schemes is the three pillar system proposed by the World Bank (1994). According to this
study, the first pillar is similar to existing PAYGO public systems managed and funded
by the government. Its aim is to prevent poverty and to redistribute income. The second
pillar includes mandatory contributions to pension funds under private management. The
contributions are percentage of the wage income and aim to income replacement. The
second pillar has raised a lot of controversy among academia and governments due to its
private, mandatory and defined contribution element 1. The third pillar has complementary
character and involves voluntary contributions to pension funds under private management.
Its aim is income replacement.
A popular parametric reform is the implementation of the Notional Defined Contri-
bution (NDC) system. High transitional costs and the complicacy of structural reforms
have made this model attractive to many economies. In this system, the workers’ con-
tributions are defined while benefits depend on the amount contributed and the returns
on investment. NDC consists of two elements: The first one resembles the fully funded
system in a sense that there are individual "notional" accounts where contributions are
defined and will determine individuals pensions. However, the contribution of the current
employees are used to pay current pensions and other expenditures. The second element
1For a meticulous critique on World Bank’s "Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old
and Promote Growth", refer to Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999, "Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths about
Social Security Systems".
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is of redistributive character financed by general taxation. In reality, this is a PAYGO
financed scheme with defined contributions 2. This new approach has been adopted by six
countries: Sweden (1994), Italy (1995), Latvia (1996), the Kyrgyz Republic (1997), Poland
(1999) and Mongolia (2000).
Of all world regions, reforms in the Latin American countries have received most of the
research attention as many of them are radical, innovative and there is suﬃcient time and
data to draw conclusions. Even though each reform has its own features, the reforms in
Latin America had a common characteristic: a second fully funded pillar based on defined
contributions (DC) to individuals’ accounts managed by private companies. These accounts
are invested in financial markets and benefits depend on individual contributions and on the
returns of pension fund assets (Schmidt-Hebbel, 1999). The first radical reform took place
in Chile (1981) where the country moved from a public unfunded and defined contribution
system to a funded defined contribution one under private management. The state still
plays an important role by supervising and regulating the new system, providing minimum
benefits and financing the transition (Holzmann, 1996). After Chile other Latin American
countries moved towards privatisation of their pension funds such as Argentina (1994),
Uruguay (1996), Bolivia (1997) and Mexico (1997) with Dominican Republic (2003-5) to
be the most recent one.
According to Mesa-Lago’s (2002) evaluation of pension reforms in Latin America, the
eﬀects are not uniform and vary from country to country. First, the amount of insured that
moved to private systems is impressively large: 94-97% in Chile, 75% in Argentina, 100%
in Bolivia and Mexico. In the last two countries, however, the transfer was not a product of
free choice as in other Latin American countries, but it was mandatory. Second, employees’
contribution rose significantly while participation from employers fell. This may cause a
bigger economic burden for the insured and disincentives for compliance.
Theory predicts that competition among private providers will cut managerial costs
and promote eﬃciency. Yet, there is no certainty that competition in insurance markets
will improve: Evidence show that the number of administrators increased initially and then
shrunk through mergers. Concentration of aﬃliates in the three largest administrators has
been observed to countries that did not set an upper limit of ensured to each administrator.
Moreover, the largest providers did not necessarily oﬀer the highest investment returns or
the lowest commissions. Administrative costs are not found to be considerably lower due
to managerial expenses for marketing advertising and commissions to salespersons.
With regard to the role of pension reforms in economic performance, Holzmann (1997),
in his preliminary study about the reforms in Chile, finds a 0.9-2.1 percentage points
contribution to the country’s high economic growth that occurred in the 80s. In particular,
2Barr N. (2004), Ch.4 "Non-Financial Defined Contribution Pensions: Mapping the Terrain".
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his findings demonstrate a strong relationship between pension funds, financial markets
development and total factor productivity which are linked to economic growth. Schmidt-
Hebbel (1991) also attributes a quarter of country’s growth to its 1981 radical pension
reform.
While higher capital accumulation and investment find strong evidence in Latin Amer-
ica, empirical results about rise of national savings are contradictory and depend on various
factors such as whether transitional fiscal costs have been deducted from private pension
savings. When they are taken into account, negative correlation between national savings
and pension reform is shown for the first 10 to 15 years. Governments should cautiously
set the rise of national savings as a goal from a pension reform. Private savings may go
either way as individuals behaviour depends on many factors. On the other hand, public
savings may fall if government fully supports the transition 3. Holzmann (1997) shows a
negative relationship between reforms and domestic savings for the period 1981 to 1988
in Chile. After 1989 this relationship becomes positive mainly due to higher returns on
capital investment. While the impact on the private saving rate is ambiguous, the public
saving rate is clearly higher, as it was required to support the transition.
In Africa, most low income countries have no national pension systems and the elderly
counts on young generations to provide but this link is becoming weaker. In the mid-
dle income countries of North Africa, pensions systems are rudimental and cover a small
percentage of the labour force (Fox and Palmer, 2001). Even though the population is
young with a very low dependency ratio compared to other regions (4.7- 6 percent in 1995
according to the World Bank) most of the existing public systems suﬀer form credibility,
corruption and mismanagement4 leading to large and unfunded liabilities which will have
to be balanced by future generations. Many African countries consider the introduction of
public or mixed pension systems. Nigeria is the first one to introduce a multi pillar scheme
in 2005 and other countries such as South Africa consider similar solutions.
Strong demographic trends and ageing have made reforms necessary for many Asian
countries: The 1979 implementation of the one-child-per-family policy in China will boost
the ratio of retirees to current workers from 29 percent in 2001 to 55 percent in 2039. In
the face of rapid population ageing, China moved to a partly funded three pillar system in
a series of reforms during the 90s. The 1st pillar is PAYGO, financed by current revenues
descending from the old "iron rice bowl" system which provided social security to state em-
ployees until the end of their lives. The 2nd pillar is a mandatory DC system designed to be
self financed with individual accounts and the 3rd pillar is a voluntary contributions scheme
3For example the Chilean government experienced high deficits coming from loss of contributors and
expenditures for recognition bonds (Holzmann 1997).
4For example in Kenya, 100 percent of contributions collected cover administrative costs (Barbone and
Sanchez, 1999).
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to private insurance companies. Despite its self financed and independent character, the
DC system partially works as a PAYGO and the accounts of current employees have been
used to cover high existing deficits of the pension system and other public expenditures,
in some provinces. In addition, the current pension system covers mostly urban employees
while a large part of the rural population is not insured and counts on their families for
their welfare after retirement. Kazakhstan adopted a multi pillar system in 1998 while
India is implementing a mixed system with mandatory and voluntary contributions for its
civil servants, starting in 2004.
Many Emerging Markets in East Europe have implemented considerable structural
reforms and have followed the World Bank model (1994), with Czech Republic (1994) and
Hungary (1997) to be the first ones. Most OECD countries have not proceeded in radical
structural changes. Market oriented economies, such as the UK and the US, are privatizing
their pension funds for a long time while others have followed a mixed system similar to the
model proposed by the World Bank, such as Australia (1992), Canada (1997) and Denmark
(1991).
3 Methodology and Estimated Model
The empirical work in this paper is based on the following basic panel data model:
Yi,t = ai + τ t + βXi,t + γY Ri,t + εi,t (1)
where Yi,t represents the macroeconomic variables of interest (output, growth, capital,
investment and consumption) for country i at time t. Xi,t is the set of relevant control
variables which are described further in each subsection below. Y Ri,t denotes the impact of
the reform on the dependent variable and is proxied by the number of years that have passed
after the first structural reform in each country. The coeﬃcient γ is the main coeﬃcient
of interest. In particular, a negative sign on γ would indicate that pension reforms would
have a negative eﬀect on the above macroeconomic variables. There is, however, no a
priori reason to believe that any positive or negative reform comes about immediately. For
example, theoretical models (Schmidt-Hebbel 1997, Equipe Ingénue 2001) would predict
non linear dynamics. We capture this possibility in a simple manner by including a third
order polynomial of Y Ri,t in our regressions.
In estimating equation (1) a number of econometric issues have to be taken into account.
Firstly, in order to deal with cross sectional heterogeneity we introduce cross sectional fixed
eﬀects ai and to capture time specific heterogeneity we include time specific fixed eﬀects
τ t. The RHS variables are potentially endogenous in this model. To minimise the possible
impact of endogeneity we only include lagged variables on the RHS of the equation (1).
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A natural choice in this scenario is the GMM estimator introduced by Arellano and
Bond (1991). However the relatively small cross sectional dimension of our panel makes the
implementation of the GMM estimator potentially diﬃcult. More precisely, the eﬃciency
of GMM estimates is low in panels with a small N (see Judson and Owen 1997). Therefore
we estimate our regression models using fixed eﬀects estimator but also report results from
GMM regressions.
Another potential concern is the fact that the impact of pension reform (and the other
control variables) may be diﬀerent across countries. This is especially true in our data set
that includes both developed and developing countries with diﬀerent economic structure.
The second part of the paper examines how government’s fiscal behaviour and financial
structure contribute to the positive or negative impact on growth we find in section 5.
To test this additional question we augment equation (1) as follows:
Yi,t = ai + τ t + βXi,t + γY Ri,t + δ (Y Ri,t × Fi,t) + εi,t (2)
The extra term Y Ri,t × Fi,t represents an interaction between the years after pension
reform and a set of factors that may have an impact on the magnitude of the benefit of
pension reforms. In other words, the coeﬃcient δ captures how Fi,t alters the impact of
pension reform. The variables Fi,t include public debt, age dependency and measures of
financial market development.
4 Data and Choice of Variables
This empirical analysis, uses panel data on 27 countries, of which 7 are developed economies
and 20 are Emerging Markets (EMEs). A list of countries is provided in Table 1 together
with the dates for the start of pension reforms in each country. These dates are crucial in
determining our pension reform variable Y R. The classification of these countries as reform
ones are based on the criteria that they have moved a part or whole of their PAYGO system
towards a funded one, with private insurance (voluntary or mandatory) holding a signifi-
cant role on benefits. This means that reformed PAYGO systems with a new mandatory
and private fully funded component are also included since they have undergone through
major reform. However, in this study we do no include NDC systems even if in the theory
are defined contributions systems and fully funded, many of them operate in a PAYGO
basis under public management, trying to cover existing social security deficits. There are
alternative ways of carrying out this classification. For example, the International Federa-
tion of Pension Funds Administrators (FIAP) considers reform countries those that have
introduced individual capitalisation of savings in a compulsory basis. FIAP’s classification
includes also the NDC countries.
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The years of the initial reforms, showed in Table 1, are collected from various sources
(Mesa-Lago, 2002; James, 2005; FIAP, 2007; Hu, 2005; Schwarz, Demirguc-Kunt, 1999;
Capretta 2007, and various papers from International Social Security Review Vols 54, 55
and 56, 2001, 2002, 2003) and are based on first steps towards fully funded pension systems.
The dates are cross checked from various sources and we used the ones met in most sources.
Diﬀerences in dates can be observed due to diﬀerent dates of voting and implementation
of a reforming law. Our classification may not capture the homogeneity in the degree
of reform that each country has undergone. In several of them both public and private
pension systems co exist and employees participate in both or interchange between the
two: In Colombia, for example, workers have to decide between a downsized PAYGO or a
private account but they can revise their decision after three years while in Argentina this
is not possible. In Uruguay, poor workers are included automatically in the public system
while the high earners can contribute in both systems. In other countries the pension
reform is an ongoing process, such as the UK, and more than one dates can be considered
as a reform initiator. We choose the dates where laws towards private fully funded systems
have been adopted. Overall, it is very diﬃcult to capture these diﬀerences across countries.
Instead, in our framework, we attempt to capture the overall impact of reform.
A list of control variables Xi,t is shown in Table 2 while Table 3 provides basic de-
scriptive statistics of the data set. Most of these data are taken from World Development
Indicators (2006), OECD Economic Outlook (2007) and IFS Country Tables (2007). Fi-
nancial Markets variables are obtained from the financial structure dataset of T. Beck and
E. Al- Hussainy, World Bank, ( 2007) and from Global Financial Data. Gross National Dis-
posable Income data for Latin American countries are taken from the Statistical yearbook
for Latin America and the Caribbean (2006), Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLAC). The data for central government’s total debt come from the paper of Danny
Jaimovich, Ugo Panizza (2006). Privatisation’s data come from a variety of sources: From
1988 to 1999 data come from FDI.net while from 2000 to 2005 data are aggregated from
World Bank’s Privatisation Database for the EME’s and from OECD’s Financial Trends for
the developed economies. In addition we calculate GDP and real exchange rate volatility
by using GARCH (1,1) models. The dataset is annual and the maximum span is 1960-2006.
We carry out cleaning in the following manner: we visually examine each country’s series
checking specifically for large outliers and typos. We either remove anomalous observations
or replace them with interpolated values. Table 4 provides an analysis of the stationarity
properties of the data set. In particular, we carry out two panel unit root tests for each
variable, both in levels and in diﬀerences. We use the Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC) test
which includes Fixed Eﬀects and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) ADF tests that allows for
heterogeneity across countries.
Table 3 suggests a mixed picture across the range of explanatory variables. We find
evidence of stationarity for variables such as GDPPC, real interest rate, inflation, liquidity
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to GDP ratio etc. while it is diﬃcult to reject the null hypothesis for some macroeconomic
variables such as GDP per capita, Disposable Income, Capital Stock. This mixed picture
complicates attempts to conduct cointegration analysis of eq. (1). Therefore we do not use
cointegration models in the empirical analysis below.
5 Empirical Results
The empirical result of the paper are presented in section 5. Section 5.1 attempts to answer
the first question of the paper set out in the introduction: it investigates the impact of
pension reform on output per capita, capital stock formation, consumption their growth
rates. Section 5.2 extends this analysis further by considering diﬀerent factors that can
reinforce the estimated eﬀects of pension reforms.
5.1 Impact of Pension Reforms
5.1.1 on Output per capita
The question of interest in this section is whether pension reforms have contributed to a
higher level of output per capita and whether have enhanced growth. The two way error
component model is written as follows:
LogGDPPCi,t = αi + τ t + βLog(Xi,t−1) + γ∆Log(Zi,t−1) + δY Ri,t + εi,t (3)
where GDPPC is the GDP per capita. The explanatory variables reflect macroeco-
nomic conditions as captured by the real interest rate (RealInt)5, inflation (∆CPI) and
trade openness (Trade). Trade openness is measured by the sum of exports and imports
of goods and services divided by the GDP. Financial development is proxied by domestic
credit provided to the private sector (DomCred) and the liquid liabilities (Liq) both as a
proportion of GDP. The role of the stock market is introduced by the ratio of stock market
total value traded to GDP (SMTrade) and the stock capitalisation to GDP (SMCap)6
We take demographics into account by including the age dependency ratio (AgeDep) for
each country. As discussed above Y R is meant to reflect the impact of pension reforms
in this model (after controlling for the other variables discussed above). As in Packard
(2001), we consider a third order polynomial in this variable in order to capture possible
non linearities in this relationship.
The benchmark results are reported in the first column of Table 5. The Hausman
specification tests suggest that the FE model is preferred to the Random Eﬀects (RE)
specification. In addition, we strongly reject the hypothesis that the time and cross section
5Series for the real interest rate are estimated by the World Bank.
6We also found qualitatively similar results when using the Stock Market Turnover Ratio.
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eﬀects are zero. In terms of the control variables we find a negative and significant coeﬃ-
cient for the real interest rate. Trade openness and the stock market capitalisation which
proxies financial markets’ developments have both positive and significant coeﬃcients, in
accordance with economic theory.
As in Packard (2001) we find that a third order polynomial in Y R fits the data well
with statistically significant coeﬃcients for all three terms. (Y R2 and Y R3 are jointly
significant with the Wald test statistic (p-value) equal to 6.482 (0.0018). The signs suggest
a J curve type eﬀect of the reforms on the level of output per capita. In other words there
is a negative initial impact of pension reforms which becomes positive as the years after
reform (Y R) increase. This simple point is illustrated in Figure 1 which shows a scatterplot
of this relationship for each country7. It is interesting to note that it takes about 10 years
for the positive impact of pension reform to appear in our model (e.g. Chile, Australia,
UK8).
The second and the third column of Table 5 split our panel into seven industrialised
and 20 EMEs countries in order to investigate the presence of cross region heterogeneity.
For the emerging markets the coeﬃcient on Y R and Y R2 is negative (with the latter
statistically significant) possibly suggesting a more prolonged initial negative eﬀect of the
reform. The results for the industrialised countries are diﬀerent: The coeﬃcient on Y R
is large, positive and significant indicating that pension reforms had a positive impact on
GDPPC on these countries. One potential explanation for these regional diﬀerences is
that most reforms in industrialised countries were smooth and gradual while the EMEs
reforms, (especially in Latin America) were more radical and the implementation period
was shorter9. These split sample results provide evidence of heterogeneity in the impact of
pension reforms across countries. We return to this issue in section 5.2.
In Table 6 we re-estimate our main specification by using i) OLS fixed eﬀect model in
first diﬀerences and ii) Arellano and Bond GMM. The aim is to obtain estimates which are
less susceptible to endogeneity of the RHS variables. In addition, these alternative models
may indicate whether the relationships discussed above hold in growth rates. There are
two issues surrounding the GMM estimates. Firstly, the relatively small cross section in
7The figure plots YR against the fitted values of logGDPPC as predicted by our estimated equation.
8The figure also shows that the Netherlands is an outlier in the sense that it displays a negative eﬀect
in the long run. This may explain why we get a small negative coeﬃcient for Y R3. In order to explore
this further we re estimate the model leaving Netherlands out of the panel. The aim is to check if there is
substantial change in the results in this case. Table 13 presents coeﬃcient estimates from the benchmark
model using this truncated panel. The results show that the pattern of coeﬃcients on YR and YR2 is
similar to the benchmark case. In particular, the coeﬃcient on YR is small and insignificant while the
coeﬃcient on YR2 is significant and positive indicating that the positive eﬀect of pension reform manifests
itself gradually.
9Note, however, that the relatively small cross sectional dimension of the industrilised group could be
another reason behind the diﬀerent results.
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our panel possibly makes the GMM results less robust. Secondly, the GMM estimator
proceeds by eliminating the FE from equation (3) via first diﬀerencing. This implies that
the GMM equation includes ∆Y R therefore the interpretation of the coeﬃcient of this
variable is diﬀerent in this model.
The first two columns in Table 6 present the results of the OLS FE model in diﬀer-
ences and the GMM (default) model. The GMM models use a common instrument set
consisting of the second lag of the level of the RHS variables and the second to the fourth
lag of GDPPC. Note that the Sargan test fails to reject the validity of the instruments.
Furthermore we find no evidence of second order serial correlation. The benchmark re-
gression in the first and second columns of the Table 6 suggest that the growth of output
(∆GDPPC) has increased after the reform. The higher order terms are insignificant in
most specifications. These results are robust to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
(column 3). Overall, the results are supportive of a positive impact of pension reform on
GDPPC in growth rates and suggest that the estimates in Table 5 are not simply picking
up the trend in GDPPC10.
The final sensitivity check concerns possible multicollinearity between Y R and the stock
market variables. That is under a scenario where pension reform aﬀects GDPPC solely
through its impact on financial markets, including both Y R and SMTrade and SMCap on
the RHS of equation (3) may lead to imprecise estimates of the impact of pension reform.
On the other hand, a more complex interaction between financial market development
and pension reform is also a possibility. The last column in Table 6 simply repeats the
estimation of our benchmark model excluding the stock market variables. The coeﬃcients
on Y R still show the same pattern suggesting a negative initial impact and a positive
eventual eﬀect.
5.1.2 on Capital Formation and Investment
Some theoretical models suggest that a switch to fully funded systems will increase cap-
ital levels and investment. This can happen in two ways: Firstly, capital accumulation
and investment can increase through financial deepening accompanying pension reform.
Secondly, it may occur directly through higher national savings. Feldstein and Samwick
(1996) in a study for the US case, estimate that mandatory savings together with decrease
10We explore the possibility that YR maybe influenced by country specific variations in the LHS variable
(due to diﬀerences in the business cycle) by re estimating our main specification in Table 5 using country
specific time eﬀects. An F test of joint significance of these time eﬀects has a p value of 0.782 suggesting
that they are not important. In addition the pattern of the coeﬃcients on Y R, Y R2, Y R3 is very similar
to the pattern reported in Table 5 with the positive impact of pension reform estimated to be gradual. See
Appendix 2 for the coeﬃcient estimates.
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in distortionary income or payroll taxes will increase US capital stock by 12% in 25 years
after the full implementation of the new system. In theory agents may reduce their private
savings in order to contribute to the mandatory individual accounts and the overall eﬀect
may be zero as Orszag and Stiglitz, (1999) believe. However most agents, according to
Feldstein and Samwick (1996), have insuﬃcient savings so the mandatory contributions
will represent additional savings which in turn will increase national savings and capi-
tal accumulation11. In theory, additional savings which are not distributed immediately
as pensions but are invested in the stock market must increase the level of investment
and capital accumulation. In this section we examine whether capital accumulation and
investment have been aﬀected in the reforming countries.
As in the previous section we investigate the relationship between pension reform and
capital accumulation via the following simple model:
LogKPCi,t = αi + τ t + βLog(Xi,t−1) + γ∆Log(Zi,t−1) + δY Ri,t + εi,t (4)
where KPC denotes the capital stock scaled by population. Xi,t and Zi,t include
variables that control for future profitability (stock market total value traded to GDP
(SMTrade), trade openness (Trade), the real interest rate (RealInt) and economic uncer-
tainty (GDP and real exchange rate variances (GDPV ar and RealERV ar respectively)).
This choice reflects the variables typically included in aggregate investment equations. As
in equation (3) Y R denotes the number of years after the reform. Again we consider a
third order polynomial in order to capture non linearities in the relationship.
The first column of Table 7 presents the results from the benchmark model. The
Hausman test indicates that the FE model is more appropriate. We find that KPC is
positively aﬀected by SMTrade and Trade while our measure of uncertainty GDPV ar
has significant negative impact. The impact of Y R on capital is similar to its eﬀect on
GDPPC. In particular, Y R2 has a significant and positive coeﬃcient. In contrast the
coeﬃcient on Y R is insignificantly diﬀerent from zero. This suggest that any positive
impact of pension reform on KPC does not materialise immediately possibly suggesting
a similar pattern to the J curve eﬀect found in the previous section. This is illustrated
in Figure 2 which plots Y R against the value of KPC predicted by the years to reform.
The second and the third columns split the sample into EMEs and industrialized countries.
Our estimates are generally consistent with the results for GDPPC. More specifically, we
find some evidence of a positive impact of the reform for industrialized countries, while
this beneficial eﬀect appears to be absent from the EMEs sample.
11Another key diﬀerence between the two approaches is the diﬀerent rate of return of PAYGO system
and private funds. Supporters of privitazation argue that individual accounts invested on the stock market
will carry much higher return than a PAYGO system. The return on a PAYGO mature system, which
according to Samuelson (1958) is equal to the sum of labour force and productivity growth, is not expected
to be very high in an ageing population economy.
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Note that we supplement this benchmark model with GMM regressions carried out
using the following first diﬀerenced model with investment (∆LogKPC) as the dependent
variable:
∆LogKPCi,t = αi + τ t + β∆Log(Zi,t−1) + δ∆Y Ri,t + εi,t (5)
Table 8 presents estimates of the equation (5). In order to tackle endogeneity we re-estimate
our model by using first order diﬀerences with FE and GMM similar to the previous section.
The results in Table 8 show no empirical evidence for significant impact of pension reforms
on investment by regressing the default model in FE and in GMM. When we include the
lagged dependent variable in the control variables (3rd column) we find a positive significant
eﬀect which takes place after some years from the implementation of the reform (Y R2).
This is consistent with the findings for capital accumulation which suggest a rise in the
medium run.
5.1.3 on Consumption
In this section we investigate whether pension reforms have influenced aggregate per capita
consumption. Planned consumption depends on total wealth, human and non human
(Deaton, 1992). Non human wealth can include financial wealth (assets, bonds, life in-
surance, pension assets, etc.) and non financial, tangible wealth such as housing. Assets
that can be liquidated easier, aﬀect consumption more when consumers face credit con-
straints, while in developed financial markets both types of assets have significant impact.
According to the permanent income hypothesis, an agent decides his consumption in each
period according to his life time resources (income). This theory explains why temporary
fiscal policies may have a smaller eﬀect than permanent ones: a decrease of the payroll tax
due to privatisation of the pension system is a permanent measure and will influence the
permanent income. The same holds for structural pension reforms.
Caroll and Summers (1991) found evidence against the permanent income hypothesis
by showing a strong relationship between consumption and income growth rates and Wolﬀ
(1998) showed that, given most households attain little wealth, consumption paths track
approximately income paths. When pension reforms are matched with tax cuts they can
aﬀect current income as well. According to the Random Walk Hypothesis which accounts
for uncertainty, any change in consumption is unpredictable and the only driving force is
the real interest rate (Hall, 1978). This comes from the discount factor in the intertemporal
optimisation of the consumption path. However, Hall found significant impact of lagged
stock price movements. A vast literature has developed beyond these two main approaches
which examines additional factors: liquidity constraints, personal disposable income and
financial wealth (for example, see Barrell, Byrne and Dury, 2003).
To examine whether reforms in the public pension system have an impact on aggregate
per capita consumption we estimate the following model:
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LogCPCi,t = αi + τ t + βLog(Xi,t−1) + γ∆Log(Zi,t−1) + δY Ri,t + εi,t (6)
CPC stands for consumption per capita, and Xi,t is the vector of the control variables.
The control variables are chosen to account for the diﬀerent theoretical determinants of
consumption mentioned above. In particular we use the real interest rate (RealInt) in
accordance with the arguments in Hall (1978). As in Caroll and Summers (1991) and
others we include a measure of current real household disposable income (DispInc). The
stock market index (relative to GDP) is included to capture the impact of financial wealth
on consumption. We also include a measure of liquidity (Liq) to account for financial
markets’ liberalisation and hence possible changes in the degree of liquidity constraints.
The first column of Table 9 shows the benchmark estimates of equation using fixed
eﬀect estimator. We find that real interest rate has a significant negative impact on con-
sumption. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient on disposable income and the stock market index
are positive and significant. The estimated coeﬃcient on Y R is very small but statisti-
cally significant suggesting that the impact of pension reform on consumption is marginally
positive in our sample. This provides tentative evidence that economic agents may have
increased their consumption in anticipation of higher returns from private pension funds in
the future. The second and the third column of the table show that this positive impact on
consumption may be limited to industrialised countries. The estimated coeﬃcient on Y R
in industrialised countries sample is significant while the estimate for the same coeﬃcient in
the EMEs is insignificant. Note, however, that the precision of this result for industrialised
countries may be in doubt because of the small cross section.
Table 10 tests the robustness of these results by re estimating the equation (6) in
first diﬀerences using fixed eﬀects and GMM. The first two columns show that the positive
eﬀect of pension reform is still evident when a) estimation is carried out in first diﬀerences
and b) the Arellano and Bond GMM estimate is used. The final column of the table adds
a lag of consumption to the RHS of the equation. In this case there is less evidence for the
importance of pension reform. Although the coeﬃcient is still positive it is too imprecisely
estimated to make a strong case about an important eﬀect of pension reform.
5.2 Factors that reinforce the impact of pension reforms
In this section we investigate the factors that aﬀect the magnitude of the benefits from
pension reforms, as measured by their eﬀect on output (see equation (3)). We estimate
specifications of the following type:
LogGDPPCi,t = αi+τ t+βLog(Xi,t−1)+γ∆Log(Zi,t−1)+δY Ri,t+ζ (Y Ri,t × Fi,t)+εi,t (7)
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The basic RHS control variables are the same as in equation (2). As discussed above we
now include additional interaction terms (Y Ri,t × Fi,t) to capture the factors that influence
the magnitude of pension reforms. We assume that the variables that can potentially aﬀect
the relationship between pension reforms and GDPPC include public debt to GDP ratio,
age dependency ratio, number of privatisations and stock market capitalisation.
We interact public debt as a percentage of GDP with the reform variables to account for
the argument in Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) among others, that the government needs resources
to support pension reforms and the generations in transition, who may bear the burden.
Here we formally investigate whether a lower level of public debt enables higher positive
impact of pension reform.
We explore the impact of the population structure by including age dependency as
an additional variable in Fi,t. Several countries have combined structural pension reforms
with an increase in the retirement age, therefore a decrease in age dependency ratio. It was
common policy for many Latin American countries to try to downsize the implicit debt of
their PAYGO system before moving to a new FF system by either increasing pension con-
tributions or increasing retirement age. Retirement age was increased in Chile, Argentina
and Uruguay while the eligibility period for retirement was increased in Argentina and El
Salvador. Our aim is to investigate whether a fall in age dependency can aﬀect the impact
of structural pension reforms. For example, in a country with high number of retirees
the working population during the reform will be burdened more by higher taxes or cuts
in government expenditure. This could potentially reduce benefits accruing from pension
reforms.
The development and deepening of financial markets can also positively influence pen-
sion reforms and enhance their results. Moreover, the privatisation of public pension funds
is closely linked with the returns from financial markets. For these reasons we include
interaction terms with the stock capitalisation variable.
In many emerging markets, especially the ones which carried out pension reforms with-
out the immense problem of population ageing, the pension reform was a large component
of a new economic development approach which aimed at decentralisation of economic
decisions to private agents, privatisation of public enterprises and market liberalisation
(Schmidt-Hebbel, 1999). Privatisation of public companies led to lower government expen-
diture. For example, many East European countries sold public organisations after their
transition from communist to market oriented economies. We aim to examine whether re-
forms which took place in a general privatisation environment were more successful in terms
of output. Therefore, we interact the number of privatisations’ transactions (PrivatNo)
with the variables of the reforms (Y R).
The main results are presented in Table 11. The first column in the Table 11 presents
results from our most general specification (which encompasses all macroeconomic and
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financial variables and allows interactions with all candidate variables that may facilitate
pension reforms). As in Table 5 the coeﬃcients on Y R, Y R2, Y R3 follow a pattern that
suggests a J curve type eﬀect. The estimated coeﬃcient on public debt is negative and
significant. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term lnDebt×Y R, is positive and significant
while the impact of lnDebt× Y R2 is negative. Note that these signs are opposite to those
on Y R and Y R2. In total, this implies that high debt levels dampen benefits arising from
the reforms. This result is best illustrated in Figure 3a where the impact of pension reforms
on GDPPC is shown for diﬀerent levels of public debt for two countries. The two countries
depicted here are characterised by high and low public debt respectively. In both cases a
positive eﬀect from the reforms is observed, which becomes larger for higher values of Y R.
However, in the case of the highly indebted country, this positive impact becomes smaller
as debt increases12.
Column 1 shows statistically significant estimates for lnAgeDep × Y R. As Figure 3b
illustrates, this result implies that high age dependency may reduce the positive impact
of pensions reforms. In particular, it makes the impact more non linear with a noticeable
negative eﬀect in the short run. This can be seen from the left panel of Figure 3b which
shows the relationship between Y R and GDPPC for diﬀerent levels of age dependency in
Costa Rica13.
Stock Market capitalisation is also found to aﬀect the impact of pension reforms posi-
tively. Nevertheless, this result is evident only when the interactions involving this variable
are considered separately. Figure 3c illustrates the role of stock market capitalisation in
our main specification (column 1) while Figure 4 shows the results for the specification in
column 3. It is clear that the eﬀect of stock market capitalisation is evident only in the
second case where higher value of this variable increases the benefit of pension reform.
In the last column of Table 11 we interact the number of privatisation with the pension
reform variables. In many East European countries, privatisations of the public pension
system was a part of a general privatisation plan and contraction of the government size.
For example, the Bulgarian pension reforms initiated in 2000, after a big wave of public
sector privatisations. We do not include privatisation in our main model because the lack
of data for some countries significantly decreases the number of cross sections. In the last
column we estimate a separate regression for 16 countries. The result suggests that public
pension reforms accompanied by privatisations of other public organisations performed was
more beneficial in terms of increasing output. This result is indicated by the significant
positive coeﬃcient on LnPrivatNo × Y R. The last panel of Figure 3 illustrates this for
two countries with low and high number of privatisations respectively.
12The results are the same if debt is considered separately in our model (column 2 of Table 11).
13As in the case of public debt, qualitatively the results remain the same in column 3 of Table 11.
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6 Conclusions
This paper examines the macroeconomic eﬀects of structural reforms of the public pension
system. In particular, it examines the consequences of major reforms on public PAYGO
systems towards fully funded ones.
The findings show that structural pension reforms have a J curve type eﬀect on output
per capita. In other words we estimate the immediate impact on output per capita to be
negative with the benefits of the reforms appearing after about 10 years. We find qualita-
tively similar results for the impact on the capital stock. There is some weak evidence that
consumption (per capita) increases slightly after the reform. Our estimates also indicate
that the growth rate of these variables is positively aﬀected by the introduction of the
funded system.
The second part of this study focuses on the factors that cause the impact of funded
systems to vary across countries. We examine the role of public debt ratio to GDP, the age
dependency ratio, the capitalisation ratio of financial markets and the number of privati-
sation on reforms. by interacting those factors with the proxied variable for the pension
reforms. Our results suggest that sound fiscal policy in the reform environment is an impor-
tant contributing factor to the resulting benefit on output per capita. More specifically, our
estimates show that highly (public) indebted countries respond less to this kind of reforms
in terms of output change. Therefore, reduction in the levels of public debt and increase of
public savings help the economy to adapt better to these changes. Furthermore, countries
which followed public expenditure cuts by proceeding to privatisations of public companies
appear to have benefited more from the reforms. Reforms are also found to perform better
in economies with low age dependency ratio and developed financial markets.
The empirical work in this paper is based on diﬀerent estimators: namely fixed eﬀects
and Arellano and Bond (1986) GMM. In general, the main results are similar across these
two estimators. Our preferred model, however, is based on the fixed eﬀects estimator. This
is mainly because in a panel with a small cross sectional dimension GMM appears to have
a large variance with its results largely dependent on the instrument set chosen. Given
that the time series in the panel is relatively large any biases associated with fixed eﬀects
are likely to be small (see Nickel, 1981).
The analysis in this paper does not examine the eﬀects of the system change on labour
markets or on the controversial saving rate. It does however find a positive impact of
reforms on capital formation and investment in the countries of question. Future research
will consider the change in returns of pension funds and their impact on growth.
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7 Appendix I
In this Appendix we test the robustness of these results of eq.(2) by adopting a cross
sectional approach. More specifically we estimate the following expression:
Im pactPRi = αi + βLn(Xi,) + εi (8)
The dependent variable is derived using the following expression: Im pactPR = aˆY Ri +
βˆY R2i + γˆY R
3
i . The coeﬃcients αˆ, βˆ, γˆ are obtained by estimating equation (3) separately
for each country in our panel. The number of observations for each country is generally
small. Therefore, we follow a general to specific procedure in selecting a parsimonious
specification for each country. That is we start by using all the control variables in equation
(3) and then we eliminate either highly insignificant variables or those which lack suﬃcient
number of observations14. The expression for ImpactPR provides an estimate of the eﬀect
of pension reform that varies with YR. For the cross section regressions we consider the 5
year average and the 5 year sum of the series where both are calculated after the beginning
of the reform.
14The individual regressions are available on request.
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The RHS variables include the average growth of public debt, the average number of
privatisations, the average age dependency ratio and the average stock market capitalisa-
tion. The averages for public debt growth is calculated for the 5 years proceeding reform.
This is done to investigate if a rise of public savings before the pension reform aﬀected
the future economic performance of the reform. Similarly, the averages for age dependency
and stock market capitalisation are taken over the same horizon 15.
Table 12 presents the estimates of our main regressions. The specifications are estimated
by using weighted least squares where we weight each observation by the reciprocal of the
number of observations in the underlying country specific time series regression 16. We start
with a very simple specification with one explanatory variable and we proceed by adding
the other control variables. The left panel uses the 5 year averages of the ImpactPR as the
dependent variable and the right panel the 5 year sum. The first column of Table 12 includes
only public debt growth. The coeﬃcient on public debt growth is negative and significant,
suggesting that higher debt growth before the pension reform had a negative eﬀect on the
subsequent impact on GDPPC. The second and the 3rd column show that the number
of privatisations and age dependency have the expected signs but are insignificant at 5%
level. The final specification includes average stock market capitalisation. The negative
coeﬃcient on this variable is diﬃcult to justify from a theoretical perspective. The results
are very similar for the 5 year sum of the ImpactPR. That is they provide fairly strong
evidence of a negative relationship between public debt and the impact of pension reforms
and some tentative evidence of the importance of age dependency and privatisation.
8 Appendix II
This appendix describes results for versions of our main specification in Section 5.1 which
include country specific time eﬀects. The estimates, as shown in Tables 14a and 14b,
suggest two main results: First, the coeﬃcient on YR in this extended model generally
follows the same pattern as the benchmark specification. In other words, the estimates
suggest a positive impact of YR on each of the dependent variables. The second conclusion
is that the country specific time eﬀects are generally non significant except for the final
regression based on the growth rate of consumption. Note that the conclusions on the
coeﬃcients on YR are not altered.
15The averages are taken 4 years before the reform and include the year of the reform. For countries
where these data are unavailable we take the averages over the first 5 available years as long as they include
the year of the reform.
16This is done to take into account the possible imprecision in estimating the dependent variable in small
samples.
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TABLE 1: Reformed Countries and Year of the Pension Reform 
 
Developed E. EME's       
Australia 1992 Argentina 1994 El Salvador 1998 
Canada 1997 Bolivia 1997 Hungary 1997 
Denmark 1991 Bulgaria 2000 Hong Kong 2000 
Netherlands 1960 Chile 1981 Israel 1995 
Switzerland 1995 China 1997 Kazakhstan 1998 
UK 1988 Colombia 1994 Mexico 1995 
US 1981 Costa Rica 2001 Nicaragua 2002 
  Croatia 2002 Peru 1993 
  Czech Republic 1994 Romania 2001 
  Dominican Rep. 2003 Uruguay 1996 
      
 
Note: The dates of reforms for the Latin American countries have been obtained by C. Mesa-Lago 
(2002), E. James (2005), for East European countries by Müller, K. (2001), Potuček (2001) and FIAP 
(2007). For most of the developed economies we found historical data in Hu (2005), FIAP (2007) and 
Capretta (2007). 
Netherlands are included since they have a large fully funded occupational pension system. Their basic 
public pension system has not been structurally reformed since its introduction in the late 50s apart 
from legislation aiming to decrease its generosity and the early retirement incentives (van Riel, 2002, 
Capretta, 2007). 
The UK pension policy has undergone constant adjustment since the mid-1970s, “in part because the 
British parliamentary system allows the dominant political party of the day to rather easily re-orient the 
pension system in its own philosophical direction” (Capretta, 2007). During the 80s the pension 
reforms initiated by the conservative party aimed at further expansion of the funded private pension 
provision as a substitute for reduced public benefits. In this table we consider the reforms initiated by 
the Social Security Act of 1986 because a large amount of employees were encouraged to abandon the 
State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and to switch to private pension schemes. These 
reforms received a lot of criticism due to the “miss selling” scandal in December 1993 (for more 
information about the UK pension system see Blake, 2003). 
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TABLE 2: Variables’ Definition, Source and Observation Period 
 
Variable Definition Source Observ. 
      Period 
GDPPC GDP per capita WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
 (constant 2000 US$)   
RealInt Real Interest Rate (%) WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
DomCred Domestic Credit to Private Sector  WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
 (% of GDP)   
Liq Liquid Liabilities to GDP BDL (2006) 1960-2005 
KPC Gross capital formation per capita  WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
 (constant 2000 US$)   
CPC Household final consumption expend. WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
 per capita (constant 2000 US$)   
AgeDep Age Dependency Ratio (dependents WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
 to working-age population.)   
CPI Consumer Price Index (2000=100) WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
SMCap Stock Market Capitalisation to GDP BDL (2006) 1976-2005 
SMTrade Stock Market Total  BDL (2006) 1975-2005 
 Value Traded to GDP   
SMTurn Stock Market Turnover Ratio WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
SMInd Stock Market Index GFD (2007) 1960-2005 
Expt Exports of goods and services WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
 (constant 2000 US$)   
Imp Imports of goods and services WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
 (constant 2000 US$)   
Trade (Exports+Imports)/GDP WDI (2006) 1960-2005 
Debt Central Government's Debt JP (2006) 1970-2005 
 over GDP in percent   
GDPVar Conditional Standard Deviation  Author's 1960-2005 
 of real GDP from a  Calculations  
 GARCH (1,1) model   
RealERVar Conditional Standard Deviation  Author's 1960-2005 
 of Real Exchange Rate Calculations  
 from a GARCH (1,1) model   
DispInc Real Households' Disposable  OECD (2007) 1970-2005 
 Income (constant 2000 US$) ECLAC (2006)  
PrivatNo Number of Privatisations Various1 1960-2005 
YR Dummy Variable: Various2 1960-2005 
 Continuous number of years    
 since introduction of reforms   
        
 
 
                                                 
1 FDI.net, World Bank's Privatization Database, Privatizationbarometer.net. 
2 See Table 1 for a detailed report.   
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TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in model’s estimation 
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum St.Dev. Observ. 
GDPPC 8303.56 3999.99 37574.10 72.33 8825.53 1169 
KPC 1643.79 742.40 8118.51 7.60 1865.19 988 
CPC 5216.16 2717.47 25136.95 52.31 5343.67 1007 
RealInt 6.87 6.18 88.11 -97.81 35.30 621 
DomCred 50.16 32.76 260.39 1.11 43.14 999 
Liq 0.48 0.40 2.56 0.05 0.33 882 
AgeDep 0.64 0.59 1.05 0.36 0.17 1334 
CPI 45.63 33.48 231.60 0.00 43.89 1098 
SMCap 0.51 0.23 5.28 0.00 0.70 442 
SMTrade 0.30 0.05 3.26 0.00 0.55 463 
SMTurn 0.42 0.32 3.29 0.00 0.44 432 
SMInd 2096.61 244.85 164243.50 0.00 7960.51 746 
Trade 0.56 0.41 4.97 0.06 0.56 1003 
Year 2.266 0 46 0 6.008 1334 
GDPVar 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 1111 
RERVar 2.12 0.04 43.98 0.00 3.50 943 
DispInc 0.007 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.035 457 
Debt 52.35 39.69 447.10 6.40 52.36 525 
PrivatNo 15.67 3.00 1136.00 0.00 76.49 257 
Pop 58.38 10.69 1315.00 1.13 191.06 1334 
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TABLE 4: Unit Root Tests 
 
                  
Variable Levels 1st Difference 
  LLC3 Prob. 
IPS4 
ADF5  Prob. LLC Prob IPS Prob 
LnGDPPC -2.716 0.003 73.154 0.042 -15.276 0.000 441.811 0.000 
LnKPC -0.335 0.369 60.597 0.145 -18.653 0.000 507.468 0.000 
LnCPC -2.883 0.002 63.093 0.101 -5.226 0.000 357.917 0.000 
RealInt/100 -1.727 0.042 177.959 0.000 -19.637 0.000 389.485 0.000 
LnDomCred 2.561 0.995 68.670 0.061 -12.408 0.000 489.259 0.000 
LnAgeDep 1.933 0.973 43.304 0.851 -2.012 0.022 114.342 0.000 
LnLiq -1.848 0.032 90.094 0.001 -30.207 0.000 557.339 0.000 
DLnCPI -6.733 0.000 -6.733 0.000 -44.885 0.000 562.060 0.000 
LnSMCap -3.136 0.001 50.609 0.033 -5.917 0.000 107.743 0.000 
LnSMTrade -2.717 0.003 63.300 0.018 -10.905 0.000 206.370 0.000 
LnSMInd 2.204 0.986 24.311 0.959 -15.668 0.000 376.414 0.000 
LnTrade 3.265 1.000 12.714 1.000 -21.003 0.000 490.970 0.000 
GDPVar -6.466 0.000 254.868 0.000 -28.397 0.000 698.027 0.000 
RERVar -13.587 0.000 216.702 0.000 -29.948 0.000 673.377 0.000 
LnDispInc -7.065 0.000 70.636 0.004 -9.488 0.000 153.882 0.000 
LnDebt -2.147 0.016 50.159 0.242 -10.193 0.000 190.343 0.000 
LnPrivatNo -3.582 0.000 40.185 0.020 -12.981 0.000 114.923 0.000 
                  
 
 
Note: The lags are selected by using the Schwartz criteria. Both LLC and IPS tests are for the null 
hypothesis of panel unit root.
                                                 
3 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). 
4 Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997, 2003). 
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TABLE 5: Effects of Pension Reforms on GDP per capita 
 
  Countries 
Variables All Indust. EME's 
RealInt(-1)/100 -0.107*** -0.526*** -0.092* 
 (-2.478) (-2.950) (-1.788) 
lnDomCred(-1) 0.017 0.03*** 0.011 
 (1.056) (2.439) (0.474) 
lnLiq(-1) -0.004 0.009 -0.042 
 (-0.170) (0.504) (-1.052) 
lnAgeDep(-1) 0.14 -1.895*** 1.058*** 
 (0.615) (-9.216) (3.459) 
∆lnCPI(-1) -0.013 0.3 0.011 
 (-0.876) (1.265) (0.539) 
lnSMCap(-1)) -0.012 -0.024 -0.026* 
 (-1.054) (-1.146) (-1.963) 
lnSMTrade(-1)) 0.019*** -0.005 0.019*** 
 (3.763) (-0.400) (3.453) 
lnTrade(-1) 0.287*** 0.306 0.335*** 
 (6.742) (1.601) (6.802) 
YR -0.01** 0.024** -0.003 
 (-1.970) (2.605) (-0.388) 
YR² 0.0007*** -0.001* -0.002** 
 (3.097) (-1.945) (-2.053) 
YR³ -0.00001*** 0.00001** 0.00006*** 
 (-3.340) (2.052) (2.771) 
    
  Tests       
Cross Section F 1080.518 486.975 1209.017 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Period F 6.484 3.782 6.124 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Hausman  χ² 100.534 NA6 39.496 
(p-value) (0.00)  (0.00) 
    
Sample Adjusted 1979-2005 1990-2005 1979-2005 
No of Countries 22 7 15 
Observations 275 102 173 
Adjusted R² 0.998 0.99 0.997 
        
 
Note: The dependent variable is the Log of GDP per capita. All regressions include country specific 
and period specific fixed effects. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and *** = 
significant at 1% level. The t statistic is reported in the parentheses. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Random Effects estimation is not possible because the number of cross sections is smaller than the 
number of coefficients to be estimated. 
 
 
 
27
TABLE 6: Effects of Pension Reforms on GDP per capita Growth 
 
             
Variables  OLS FE   GMM 
   Default  Default Lag Dep. Var. No St. Mark. 
∆RealInt(-1)/100  -0.053  0.068 -0.092 0.013 
  (-1.563)  (0.737) (-1.530) (0.231) 
∆lnDomCred(-1)  -0.035*  -0.037 -0.028 0.112** 
  (-1.706)  (-0.485) (-0.717) (2.150) 
∆lnLiq(-1)  0.012  0.074 -0.005 -0.164*** 
  (0.441)  (0.727) (-0.079) (-2.610) 
∆lnAgeDep(-1)  0.279  -0.243 -0.149 -0.431*** 
  (0.579)  (-0.980) (-1.190) (-2.190) 
∆lnCPI(-1)  -0.014  0.114** 0.078*** 0.02 
  (-1.508)  (2.190) (2.780) (0.507) 
∆lnSMTrade(-1)  0.006**  0.041*** 0.027***  
  (2.154)  (2.780) (3.090)  
∆lnTrade(-1)  0.099  0.184** 0.132** 0.492*** 
  (1.608)  (2.050) (2.350) (5.620) 
∆GDPPC(-1)     0.52***  
     (4.710)  
∆YR  0.027***  0.011* 0.007 0.00001 
  (3.103)  (1.760) (2.02) (0.014) 
∆YR²  0.001  -0.000002 -0.0002 0.0004 
  (1.043)  (-0.302) (-0.823) (0.44) 
∆YR3  0.000011**  0.000005 0.000003 -0.00001 
  (2.315)  (0.530) (0.77) (-0.298) 
   Tests           
Period F  3.141     
(p-value)  (0.00)     
Cross Section F  2.168     
(p-value)  (0.003)     
Hausman  χ²  34.409     
(p-value)  (0.00)     
Sargan    6.479 7.659 14.73 
(p-value)    (0.423) (0.999) (0.999) 
AR(2)    1.473 1.468 -0.557 
(p-value)    (0.423) (0.142) (0.577) 
Sample Adjust.  1979-2005  1979-2005 1979-2005 1964-2005 
No of Countries  24  24 24 26 
Observations  253  253 253 487 
Adjusted R²  0.303     
             
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The 1st column reports the 
estimates of OLS FE in differences. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns show the results of GMM Arellano 
and Bond (1988) estimations. The 1st and 2nd columns test the benchmark specification. The 3rd column 
includes the lagged dependent variable while the forth column abstracts from stock market variables. * 
= significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and *** = significant at 1% level. The t statistic 
is reported in the parentheses. 
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TABLE 7: Effects of Pension Reforms on Capital per capita 
 
  Countries 
Variables All Indust. EME's 
lnSMTrade(-1)) 0.093*** -0.0001 0.09*** 
 (6.309) (-0.006) (5.373) 
lnTrade(-1) 0.774*** 0.02 0.848*** 
 (5.425) (0.104) (5.025) 
GDPVar(-1)1/2 -4.26*** -4.139 -4.18*** 
 (-3.187) (-1.468) (-2.960) 
RealERVar(-1)1/2 -0.024 0.003 -0.031 
 (-0.572) (0.116) (-0.431) 
RealInt(-1)/100 -0.135 -0.87** -0.152 
 (-1.018) (-2.078) (-0.973) 
YR 0.002 0.016 0.025 
 (0.109) (1.438) (1.001) 
YR² 0.002*** 0.001** -0.002 
 (4.146) (2.394) (-1.037) 
YR³ -0.000032*** -0.00002*** 0.00012* 
 (-4.724) (-3.372) (1.757) 
    
  Tests       
Period F 4.258 4.304 2.826 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cross Section F 255.286 147.393 159.222 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Hausman χ² 38.109 NA7 23.86 
(p-value) (0.00)  (0.002) 
    
Sample Adjusted 1978-2005 1989-2004 1978-2005 
No of Countries 23 7 16 
Observations 303 104 199 
Adjusted R² 0.984 0.954 0.97 
        
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the Log of gross Capital per capita. All regressions include country 
specific and period specific fixed effects. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and 
*** = significant at 1% level. The t statistic is reported in the parentheses. 
 
                                                 
7 Random Effects estimation is not possible because the number of cross sections is smaller than the 
number of coefficients to be estimated. 
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TABLE 8: Effects of Pension Reforms on Capital per capita Growth (Investment) 
 
             
Variables  OLS FE   GMM 
   Default  Default Lag Dep. Var. No St. Mark. 
∆lnSMTrade(-1)  -0.009  0.135** 0.095**  
  (-0.867)  (2.810) (2.470)  
∆lnTrade(-1)  0.326*  0.223 0.087 1.077*** 
  (1.823)  (0.875) (0.361) (4.870) 
∆GDPVar(-1)1/2  -0.987  -3.455 -3.918 -0.119 
  (-1.320)  (-1.240) (-1.380) (-0.073) 
∆RealERVar(-1)1/2 0.032  -0.009 -0.019 -0.048 
  (1.06)  (-0.414) (-0.936) (-1.070) 
∆RealInt(-1)/100  -0.265**  -0.361 -0.256 -0.35*** 
  (-2.388)  (-1.290) (-1.150) (-2.850) 
∆lnInv(-1)     0.321***  
     (3.640)  
∆YR  0.024  -0.015 -0.017 -0.023 
  (0.809)  (-0.854) (-1.140) (-0.986) 
∆YR²  0.005**  0.002 0.002** 0.002 
  (1.920)  (0.15) (2.040) (1.09) 
∆YR3  -0.000003  -0.000003 -0.0000035** 0.000 
  (-0.107)  (-1.650) (-2.140) (1.101) 
       
   Tests           
Cross Section F  1.281     
(p-value)  (0.186)     
Period F  3.617     
(p-value)  (0.00)     
Hausman  χ²  4.529     
(p-value)  (0.807)     
Sargan    14.93 14.43 21.79 
(p-value)    (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
AR(2)    0.648 -0.191 -2.033 
(p-value)    (0.517) (0.849) (0.042) 
       
Sample Adjust.  1978-2005  1981-2005 1981-2005 1971-2005 
No of Countries  23  23 22 25 
Observations  282  231 231 423 
Adjusted R²  0.215     
             
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of capital per capita. The 1st column reports the 
estimates of OLS FE in differences. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th columns show the results of GMM Arellano 
and Bond (1988) estimations. The 1st and 2nd columns test the benchmark specification. The 3rd column 
includes the lagged dependent variable while the forth column abstracts from stock market variables. * 
= significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and *** = significant at 1% level. The t statistic 
is reported in the parentheses. 
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TABLE 9: Effects of Pension Reforms on Consumption per capita 
 
  Countries 
Variables All Indust. EME's 
RealInt(-1)/100 -0.136** 0.187 -0.171*** 
 (-1.938) (0.83) (-2.927) 
lnDispInc(-1) 0.05** 0.00 0.054 
 (2.223) (0.017) (1.388) 
lnLiq(-1) 0.033 0.108*** -0.154*** 
 (1.325) (4.736) (-3.555) 
lnSMInd(-1) 0.026** 0.013 0.0125 
 (2.077) (0.704) (0.626) 
YR 0.006** 0.014*** 0.007 
 (2.097) (5.642) (0.537) 
YR² 0.00029 -0.0001 -0.001 
 (1.357) (-0.51) (-0.869) 
YR³ -0.0000069** -0.000001 0.00004 
 (-2.032) (-0.341) (1.218) 
    
  Tests       
Period F 4.803 6.738 1.088 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.378) 
Cross Section F 943.186 92.749 472.259 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Hausman χ² 57.965 NA8 108.69 
(p-value) (0.00)  (0.00) 
    
Sample 
Adjusted 1971-2005 1971-2004 1978-2005 
No of Countries 18 7 11 
Observations 311 187 124 
Adjusted R² 0.994 0.982 0.97 
        
 
Note: The dependent variable is the Log of Consumption per capita. All regressions include country 
specific and period specific fixed effects. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and 
*** = significant at 1% level. The t statistic is reported in the parentheses. 
                                                 
8 Random Effects estimation is not possible because the number of cross sections is smaller than the 
number of coefficients to be estimated. 
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TABLE 10: Effects of Pension Reforms on Consumption per capita Growth 
 
           
Variables  OLS FE   GMM 
   Default  Default Lag Dep. Var. 
      
∆lnRealInt  -0.112***  0.149 0.033 
  (-2.995)  (1.41) (0.583) 
∆lnDispInc  0.062***  0.167*** 0.064*** 
  (3.116)  (4.460) (2.810) 
∆lnLiq  0.023  0.113 0.02 
  (1.148)  (1.540) (0.562) 
∆lnSMInd  0.034***  0.042*** 0.036*** 
  (3.090)  (2.890) (3.710) 
∆lnCPC(-1)     0.557*** 
     (6.080) 
∆YR  0.016**  0.015** 0.005 
  (2.480)  (1.900) (1.40) 
∆YR²  -2.4E-05  -2.4E-04 -6.4E-05 
  (-0.067)  (-0.460) (-0.308) 
∆YR3  -2.5E-06  -5.40E-06 1.4E-06 
  (-0.481)  (-0.70) (0.525) 
      
   Tests         
Cross Section F  2.637    
(p-value)  (0.00)    
Period F  1.143    
(p-value)  (0.00)    
Hausman  χ²  17.531    
(p-value)  (0.014)    
Sargan    12.77 10.965 
(p-value)    (0.99) (0.99) 
AR(2)    1.094 0.608 
(p-value)    (0.274) (0.543) 
      
Sample Adjust.  1972-2005  1973-2005 1973-2005 
No of Countries  18  18 18 
Observations  292  273 273 
           
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of Consumption per capita. The 1st column reports the 
estimates of OLS FE in differences. The 2nd and 3rd columns show the results of GMM Arellano and 
Bond (1988) estimations. The 1st and 2nd columns test the benchmark specification. The 3rd column 
includes the lagged dependent variable. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and 
*** = significant at 1% level. The t statistic is reported in the parentheses. 
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TABLE 11: Interactions 
           
Variables  Eq.1  Eq.2  Eq.3  Eq.4  Eq.5 
           
RealInt(-1)/100  -0.178***  -0.119**  -0.173***  -0.103**  -0.089* 
  (-3.922)  (-2.854)  (-4.091)  (-2.781)  (-1.737) 
LnDomCred(-1)  0.009  0.011  0.028**  0.023  0.032 
  (0.772)  (0.7666)  (2.064)  (1.4398)  (1.149) 
LnLiq(-1)  0.021  0.031  0.008  -0.037  -0.032 
  (0.942)  (1.283)  (0.414)  (-1.496)  (-1.108) 
LnAgeDep(-1)  0.070  0.255  -0.146  0.031  0.963** 
  (0.412)  (1.479)  (-0.833)  (0.146)  (2.876) 
∆LnCPI(-1)  -0.002  0.017  -0.034**  -0.035**  -0.062 
  (-0.108)  (1.376)  (-2.420)  (-2.162)  (-1.600) 
LnTrade(-1)  0.210***  0.297***  0.261***  0.317***  0.431*** 
  (5.386)  (7.321)  (7.672)  (8.424)  (8.167) 
LnSMCap(-1)  0.009  0.000  0.025**  0.011  0.015 
  (1.039)  (0.042)  (3.2372)  (1.204)  (1.005) 
YR  -0.074***  -0.041***  -0.033**  -0.003  -0.032*** 
  (-4.644)  (-2.947)  (-2.336)  (-0.561)  (-3.986) 
YR²  0.005**  0.004***  -0.002  0.001**  0.002*** 
  (2.143)  (3.354)  (-0.766)  (2.391)  (5.594) 
YR³  0.000006  0.000***  0.000**  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.0770)  (2.625)  (2.4090)  (3.102)  (5.965) 
LnDebt(-1)  -0.065***  -0.079***       
  (-4.423)  (-5.238)       
LnDebt(-1)*YR  0.007*  0.011***       
  (1.853)  (2.868)       
LnDebt(-1)*YR²  -0.001**  -0.001***       
  (-2.036)  (-3.233)       
LnDebt(-1)*YR³  0.000  0.000**       
  (1.621)  (2.497)       
LnAgeDep(-1)*YR  -0.081***    -0.065***     
  (-4.226)    (-3.315)     
LnAgeDep(-1)*YR² 0.003    -0.002     
  (1.225)    (-0.688)     
LnAgeDep(-1)*YR³ 0.0001    0.0003**     
  (0.589)    (2.415)     
LnSMCap(-1)*YR  -0.006**      -0.003   
  (-2.583)      (-1.200)   
LnSMCap(-1)*YR²  0.001***      0.001***   
  (2.8)      (2.621)   
LnSMCap(-1)*YR³  -0.00001**      -0.00001***   
  (-2.617)      (-2.869)   
LnPrivatNo(-1)          -0.009 
          (-1.086) 
LnPrivatNo(-1)*YR         0.006* 
          (1.825) 
LnPrivatNo(-1)*YR²         -0.0004* 
          (-1.774) 
LnPrivatNo(-1)*YR³         0.00001* 
                    (1.722) 
Tests           
Period F  2080.617  1883.942  1711.846  1335.464  783.207 
(p-value)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cross Section F  3.332  3.926  7.137  6.912  3.055 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004) 
Hausman χ²  37619.446  49.081  53.307  43.938  103.538 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           
Sample Adjusted 1989 2005  1989 2005  1979 2005  1979 2005  1989 2005 
No of Countries  21  21  22  22  16 
Observations  256  256  284  284  136 
Adjusted R²  0.999  0.999  0.998  0.998  0.998 
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TABLE 12: Factors that influence the impact of pension reforms (Cross Sectional Analysis) 
 
    LHS: Impact PR 5yrs Average   LHS: Impact PR 5 yrs Sum 
                 
Variables                
                
Eq.1
 
Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 Eq.5 Eq.6 Eq.7  Eq.8
P.Debt growth  
 
 -0.005**               
               
              
            
               
         
          
               
                
                
-0.004* -0.004* -0.004 -0.024** -0.023* -0.023* -0.021
 (-2.047)
  
(-1.818) (-1.842) (-1.619) (-2.163)
 
(-1.956) (-2.000) (-1.740)
LnPrivatNo
 
0.004 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.046
 (0.462)
 
  (0.490) (1.527) (0.334)
 
(0.374) (1.443)
LnAgeDep
 
-0.046 -0.175** -0.268 -0.888**
  (-0.616)
  
  (-2.591)  (-0.764)
  
 (-2.691)
LnSMCap  -0.027***  -0.134***
             (-3.409) 
 
           (-3.432) 
 
Tests 
 
White Heter. Test 
 
                
            
             
        
           
        
4.831 2.429 1.273 3.419 5.370 2.875 1.302 2.998
(p-value)  (0.009)  (0.076)
 
 (0.335)  (0.039)
 
(0.006)
 
(0.045) (0.323) (0.057)
No of Observ. 22 22 22 20 22
 
22
 
22
 
20
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Adjusted R² 
 
0.259 0.228 0.204 0.427 0.293
 
0.260
 
0.245
 
0.454
     
 
Note: The dependent variable “Impact” is derived using the following expression: 32Im YrYrYrapact γβ ))) ++= .  The coefficients α,β,γ are obtained by estimating equation (3) 
separately for each country in our panel. The estimates of equations 1-4 are based on a five years average of impact while for the estimates in equations 5-8 we use the five years sum. 
The equations are estimated using weighted LS. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and *** = significant at 1% level. The t statistic based on White 
Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors is reported in the parentheses. 
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TABLE 13: Fixed Effects Estimations for all countries except Netherlands 
 
GDPPC   KPC  CPC 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables     Variables    Variables   
RealInt(-1)/100 -0.108***  RealInt(-1)/100 -0.124  RealInt(-1)/100 -0.150** 
 (-2.502)   (-0.938)   (-2.008) 
lnDomCred(-1) 0.021  GDPVar(-1)1/2 -4.276***  lnDispInc(-1) 0.020 
 (0.756)   (-3.179)   (0.896) 
lnLiq(-1) 0.015  RealERVar(-1)1/2 -0.015  lnLiq(-1) 0.080*** 
 (0.510)   (-0.373)   (3.331) 
lnAgeDep(-1) 0.194  lnSMTrade(-1)) 0.094***  lnSMInd(-1) 0.028** 
 (0.842)   (6.342)   (2.161) 
∆lnCPI(-1) -0.009  lnTrade(-1) 0.767***    
 (-0.609)   (5.396)    
lnSMCap(-1)) -0.012       
 (-1.106)       
lnSMTrade(-1) 0.019***       
 (3.784)       
lnTrade(-1) 0.295***       
 (6.790)       
YR -0.006*  YR 0.010  YR 0.005** 
 (-1.576)   (0.983)   (2.243) 
YR² 0.0004***  YR² 0.0010***  YR² 0.0004*** 
 (3.185)   (4.006)   (-4.365) 
        
  Tests              
Cross Section F 1081.029   255.378   4.803 
(p-value) (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Period F 6.449   4.195   943.186 
(p-value) (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Hausman  χ² 100.738   38.196   57.965 
(p-value) (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
        
Sample 
Adjusted 1979-2005   1978-2005   1971-2005 
No of Countries 21   22   18 
Observations 261   287   311 
Adjusted R² 0.998   0.983   0.994 
               
 
Note: The dependent variable in (1) is the Log of GDP per capita, in (2) is the Log of Capital per capita and in (3) the 
Log of Consumption per capita. We follow the same specification as in Tables 5,7,9 but we use a  second order 
polynomial of YR and we do not include Netherlands in our panel. Netherlands may be an outlier since it gives a small 
but significant coefficient in YR3. * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, and *** = significant at 1% 
level. The t statistic is reported in the parentheses. 
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TABLE 14a: Fixed Effects Estimations with Country Specific Time Effects 
 
GDPPC   GDPPC growth  KPC   KPC growth 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables     Variables    Variables     Variables   
RealInt(-1)/100 -0.201***  ∆RlInt(-1)/100 -0.116***  lnSMTr(-1) 0.117***  ∆lnSMTr(-1) 0.000 
 (-2.411)   (-2.390)   (6.858)   (-0.006) 
lnDomCred(-1) -0.010  ∆lnDCred(-1) -0.034**  lnTrade(-1) 0.376***  ∆lnTrade(-1) 0.581*** 
 (-0.507)   (-1.919)   (2.558)   (2.697) 
lnLiq(-1) 0.038  ∆lnLiq(-1) 0.002  GDPVar(-1)1/2 -4.230***  ∆GDPVar(-1)1/2 -2.305** 
 (1.224)   (0.070)   (-2.968)   (-1.676) 
lnAgeDep(-1) -0.243  ∆lnAgeDep(-1) 0.138  RERVar(-1)1/2 -0.052  RERVar(-1)1/2 0.065* 
 (-1.243)   (0.212)   (-1.009)   (1.304) 
∆lnCPI(-1) -0.028*  ∆lnCPI(-1) -0.019**  RInt(-1)/100 -0.338*  ∆RlInt(-1)/100 -0.351** 
 (-1.501)   (-2.182)   (-1.577)   (-1.640) 
lnSMCap(-1)) 0.236***  ∆lnSMTr(-1) 0.009***       
 (3.826)   (2.486)       
lnSMTrade(-1)) 0.026***  ∆lnTrade(-1) 0.092*       
 (3.708)   (1.604)       
lnTrade(-1) -0.008          
 (-0.464)          
YR 0.001  ∆YR 0.016**  YR -0.014  ∆YR -0.040 
 (0.171)   (1.745)   (-1.258)   (-1.012) 
YR² 0.001***  ∆YR² 0.0003  YR² 0.003***  ∆YR² 0.002 
 (3.813)   (0.588)   (4.092)   (0.499) 
YR³ 0.0002***  ∆YR³ 0.00001**  YR³ 0.00005***  ∆YR³ 0.000 
 (-4.084)   (-1.923)   (-4.677)   (-0.569) 
           
  Tests                     
Cross Section F 582.17   2.384   188.83   1.046 
(p-value) (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.410) 
Country Spec. 
Period. F 0.83   1.262   1.29   1.342 
(p-value) (0.79)   (0.136)   (0.101)   (0.078) 
Hausman  χ²           
           
Sample Adjusted 1979-2005   1979-2005   1978-2005   1990-2005
No of Countries 22   24   23   23 
Observations 275   253   303   260 
Adjusted R²    0.177   0.981   0.161 
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TABLE 14b: Fixed Effects Estimations with Country Specific Time Effects 
 
CPC   CPC growth 
(5)  (6) 
Variables     Variables   
RealInt(-1)/100 0.073  ∆RealInt(-1)/100 0.171*** 
 (0.793)   (-3.071) 
lnDispInc(-1) 0.102***  ∆lnDispInc(-1) 0.053** 
 (3.257)   (2.624) 
lnLiq(-1) 0.089***  ∆lnLiq(-1) 0.026 
 (2.634)   (1.398) 
lnSMInd(-1) 0.078***  ∆lnSMInd(-1) 0.03*** 
 (5.878)   (3.645) 
     
YR 0.016***  ∆YR (0.014)** 
 (3.927)   (2.142) 
YR² 0.00010  ∆YR² -0.0003 
 (0.176)   (-0.873) 
YR³ -0.0000  ∆YR³ 0.00 
 (-0.918)   (0.561) 
     
  Tests         
Cross Section F 564.992   2.081 
(p-value) (0.00)   (0.001) 
Country Spec. 
Period F 1.1948   1.5362 
(p-value) (0.185)   (0.017) 
Hausman  χ²     
     
Sample Adjusted 1971-2005   1972-2005 
No of Countries 18   18 
Observations 311   292 
Adjusted R² 0.992   0.338 
          
 
 
Note: Tables 14a and 14b present the results of the fixed effects regression by using the same specifications as in Tables 
5-10. However in this table we use country specific period fixed effects instead of year specific fixed effects we used for 
the results in Tables 5-10. The dependent variables are: the Log of GDP per capita in (1), the Log of the GDP per capita 
growth in (2), the Log of capital per capita in (3), the Log of capital per capita growth in (4), the Log of consumption per 
capita in (5) and the Log of consumption per capita growth in (6). * = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% 
level, and *** = significant at 1% level. The t statistic is reported in the parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Output per capita and Pension Reform. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between Capital Stock (per capita) and Pension Reform  
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Figure3: Factors that affect Pension Reforms 
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Figure 4: Stock Market Capitalisation (3rd column) 
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